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Following the lead of federal regulations, numerous states, counties and cities have enacted laws designed
to reduce predatory lending. There is at least anecdotal evidence that predatory or abusive mortgage
lending is primarily concentrated in the subprime market. However, the impact of these local predatory
lending laws on the subprime mortgage market is unknown. The primary questions we examine are: do
these laws affect the supply and flow of subprime mortgage credit and does the experience in North
Carolina, the first state to enact a local predatory lending law, apply to other local laws?
Defining Predatory Lending
As discussed in a Housing and Urban Development (HUD)-Treasury report, defining predatory lending can
be problematic.1 This difficulty arises because predatory lending depends on the inability of the borrower to
understand the loan terms and the obligations associated with them. For example, some borrowers might
be willing to accept a prepayment penalty in exchange for lower interest rates or fees because they do not
expect to move in the near future. Or, the borrower might plan to diversify his or her portfolio away from a
home and therefore would like an interest-only loan with a balloon payment in 10 years. However,
interviews conducted by HUD, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board indicate that some,
perhaps many, borrowers using high-cost loans might not have understood that the loan had a prepayment
penalty or that it did not amortize through time, leading to a balloon payment.
Federal and Local Laws
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At the national level, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) and the regulations
promulgated under it define a class of loans that are given special consideration because they are more
likely to have predatory features and require additional disclosures. Loans covered under HOEPA include
only closed-end home equity loans that have an annual percentage rate (APR) and/or finance fees
exceeding a certain threshold. Specifically, the APR trigger is 8 percent and 10 percent above the Treasury
rate for first and second lien loans, respectively. The fee trigger is inflation-adjusted and includes dollars
paid at closing for optional insurance programs, such as health, credit life, accident, loss of income and
other debt protection programs. Home purchase loans and other types of lending backed by a home, such
as lines of credit, are not covered by HOEPA.
Local authorities have gone beyond HOEPA by introducing their own predatory lending laws that extend the
restrictions on credit to an even broader class of mortgages. These restrictions include limits on allowable
prepayment penalties and balloon payments, prohibitions of joint financing of various insurance products
with the mortgage (such as credit, life and unemployment) and requirements that borrowers participate in
loan counseling.
For example, North Carolina—the first state to enact predatory lending restrictions—expands the coverage
of HOEPA by including both closed-end and open-end mortgages. However, reverse mortgages are not
included and loan size is limited to the conventional conforming limit (loans small enough to be purchased
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and therefore not considered part of the jumbo market). North Carolina did
leave the APR triggers the same as the HOEPA triggers, although the points and fees triggers were reduced
from the HOEPA 8 percent of the total loan amount to 5 percent for loans under $20,000. For loans
$20,000 or larger, the same 8 percent trigger is used or $1,000, whichever is smaller. The North Carolina
law also prohibits prepayment penalties and balloon payments for most covered loans. The law prohibits the
financing of credit life, unemployment, disability or other life and insurance premiums, while HOEPA
includes them only as part of the trigger calculation.
Variation in the strength of local predatory laws typically comes from two sources. The first is the extent to
which the law extends coverage beyond HOEPA. The second is the extent that the law restricts or requires
specific practices. Law coverage is defined typically in terms of loan purpose, loan limit, APR and points-
and-fees triggers. Broader coverage strengthens a law. On the other hand, the extent of a law's restrictions
is typically defined by prepayment penalty and balloon restrictions, counseling requirements, restrictions on
mandatory arbitration, and other factors. Local laws, such as in Chicago and Cook County, Ill.; Colorado;
and Washington, D.C., have relatively broader coverage than others, while Cleveland, Georgia and New
Mexico laws can be said to be more restrictive.2
Do Local Predatory Laws Impact the Flow and Supply of Credit?
The widespread adoption of state and local predatory lending laws raises a natural question: What are the
potential impacts of the laws on the subprime mortgage market? Unfortunately, no research to date (to our
knowledge) has measured the costs and benefits of HOEPA and the state and local predatory lending laws.
However, researchers have been able to measure how the volume of loans reacts to the introduction of a
law. This helps answer the question of whether the laws reduce the supply of credit. Prior research has
found convincing evidence that the North Carolina predatory lending law did reduce the supply of high-cost
or subprime credit. There was some initial evidence that laws passed in Chicago and Philadelphia also had
an impact. The laws can also specifically impact the prevalence of targeted loan types or loan-related
characteristics, such as balloon payments and prepayment penalties. Balloon payment loans and
prepayment penalties tended to become a smaller portion of the market after the law in North Carolina was
introduced. Other potential impacts include substitution by lenders from one product type to another and
reduced liquidity in the secondary market.3
By introducing geographically defined predatory lending laws, policy-makers have effectively conducted a
natural experiment with well-defined control and treatment groups. Since state boundaries reflect political
and not economic regions, we can compare mortgage market conditions in states with a law in effect (the
treatment group) to those in neighboring states currently without a predatory lending law (the control
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group).4 Specifically, using the treatment and control group framework, we tested to see whether local
predatory lending laws affect the application and origination of subprime loans. We also tested to see the
rates at which subprime loan applications are rejected. If volume is unaffected, then the flow and supply of
credit to potential consumers has not been affected in the aggregate.
We extended prior research by examining the impacts in a variety of locations to see if the North Carolina
experience is representative or typical for other states. Using publicly available Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) data, we examined the change in subprime originations in each state before and after the law
became effective. The loan samples were reduced by applying the prescribed loan limit (if any) under each
law.5 Growth rates were calculated for loans associated with a list of subprime lenders as identified in the
HUD subprime lender list.6 In an attempt to create as similar comparison groups as possible, we sampled
only counties that border each other across state lines. Thus, a typical treatment group includes border
counties in a state with a law in effect, and the corresponding control group includes border counties in
neighboring states that do not have a law in effect during the observed time period (the year before and
the year after the introduction of the law). This contrasts with other studies (see footnote 3) that have
used whole neighboring states or regions to define both control and treatment groups. Our approach
should help to increase the comparability of the treatment group and the control group because they are
geographically closer and, as a result, likely to be more economically similar than full state and region
comparisons. This approach and HMDA availability reduce the sample to 10 state predatory lending laws
(California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Texas).
Using North Carolina as an example, the results show that from the year before to the year after the law
becomes effective, subprime originations decreased by 35.8 percent in the treatment counties compared
with 18.9 percent in the control counties. In other words, consistent with previous research on the North
Carolina predatory lending law, subprime originations decreased substantially more than would be expected
given the performance of the control counties. This finding also holds in four other states: Florida, Georgia,
Massachusetts and Ohio. However, in the remaining five states—California, Connecticut, Maryland,
Pennsylvania and Texas—we found that subprime originations increased more in the treatment locations.
These results indicate that the experience in North Carolina might not extend to all other predatory lending
laws, and that there might be sufficient variations in the laws that induce different responses in the flow of
high-cost credit.
The relative changes in both subprime application and rejection rates are also examined. Again, the
application results are mixed and very similar to the origination results. For example, four state laws—
California, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Texas—experienced a relative increase in applications and six state
laws—Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Ohio—experienced a relative
decrease in applications. However, the rejection rates tell a much more consistent story. In most states,
rejection rates declined more in the treatment locations than in the control locations, indicating that the
introduction of predatory lending laws was associated with a disproportionate reduction in the rate that
subprime applications were rejected. For example, California, Florida, Georgia and North Carolina
experienced a relative decrease in rejection rates of at least 14.9 percentage points. At the other extreme,
Pennsylvania and Connecticut experienced almost no relative change.
These results do not provide any indication that predatory lending laws systematically reduce the flow of
subprime credit. However, the results do show that predatory lending laws tend to be associated with lower
rejection rates of subprime mortgage applications. It can be expensive just to apply for a mortgage: the
nonrefundable application fee usually runs from $200 to $300, not to mention other unobserved or
nonpecuniary costs. Thus, while reducing rejection rates might not have been the primary purpose of the
laws, a reduction in rejections can represent substantial savings to consumers and potentially lenders, too.
Summary
Starting with North Carolina in 1999, states and other localities across the United States have introduced
legislation intended to curb predatory and abusive lending in the subprime mortgage market. These laws
usually extend the reach of HOEPA by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, lowering the
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APR and fees-and-points triggers, and prohibiting or restricting the use of balloon payments and
prepayment penalties on covered loans.
Using HMDA data on subprime loans and a sample of state laws, we found that the typical law has little
impact on the flow of subprime credit as measured by loan originations, but is usually associated with lower
rejection rates. In particular, local predatory lending laws can be associated with either increases or
decreases in applications and originations for subprime loans. Earlier research on North Carolina law had
found that the supply and flow of credit was reduced when the law became effective. We replicated this
finding but did not find any evidence that the North Carolina experience applies to all other local predatory
lending laws. It is likely that the exact nature of the law will impact the supply and flow of credit differently.
For example, some laws are designed to provide broad coverage of the mortgage market (Chicago and
Cook County laws) while other laws are more restrictive (Georgia and New Mexico laws) in terms of
prohibiting or requiring certain practices.
To help identify why fewer subprime loans are being originated under some laws but not others, future
research needs to examine how the coverage of the law and the restrictions imposed by the law impact the
flow and cost of credit. Analysis should attempt to control for not only time and location but also law
characteristics, borrower and loan characteristics, and economic conditions in both the control group and
the treatment group. In addition, research should examine to what extent there is a regulatory cost
associated with the laws that is passed on to borrowers through higher fees or interest rates.
Beginning with North Carolina in 1999, at least 23 states have passed predatory lending laws that are styled
after the federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act. That law features triggers based on fees and
the annual percentage rate. The states include Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin.
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